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Abstract. The behaviour of complex networks under failure or attack depends 
strongly on the specific scenario. Of special interest are scale-free networks, 
which are usually seen as robust under random failure but appear to be 
especially vulnerable to targeted attacks. In a recent study of public transport 
networks of 14 major cities of the world we have shown that these systems 
when represented by appropriate graphs may exhibit scale-free behaviour. In 
this paper we briefly review some of the recent results about the effects that 
defunct or removed nodes have on the properties of public transport networks.  
Simulating different directed attack strategies, we derive vulnerability criteria 
that result in minimal strategies with high impact on these systems. 
1. Introduction 
Since the last decade we witness how the ideas and methods of the graph theory 
merge with those of statistical physics and give rise to complex network science [1]. 
The emergence of complex network theory is accompanied by a very fruitful 
implementation in different branches of natural and social sciences and even in 
humanities. Realization of the fact that many natural and man-made structures have a 
network topology and in many instances such networks have much in common, 
allows for an understanding of different phenomena that occur on such networks and 
for their quantitative description. The specific type of networks we address in this 
paper are public transport networks [2-14], that provide an instance of the more 
general class of transportation networks. Whereas a network topology is not apparent 
for many structures and can be recovered only in the course of a thorough analysis of 
their subtle features, in the case of public transportation the network structure is 
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obvious and it is even fixed in the commonly used term „public transport network“ 
(PTN). However, as we will see below, there are many ways to represent a PTN in the 
form of a graph [2,4,5,10,15], some of them will be used in our study. One can 
discriminate between two main directions of research in the field of complex 
networks: on the one hand, one is interested in the structural properties of complex 
networks, on the other hand, one analyzes different phenomena that occur on 
networks. Our recent analysis of PTN [10-14] shares goals of both of these directions: 
on the one hand, we analyze topological properties of PTN of 14 major cities of the 
world [10,11], on the other hand, we address particular processes that may and do 
occur  on PTN [12-13]. Concerning the latter case we analysed effects that defunct or 
removed nodes have on the properties of PTN.  Simulating different directed attack 
strategies, we derived vulnerability criteria that result in minimal strategies with high 
impact on these systems. In this paper we briefly review some of the recent results 
about behaviour of PTN under random failure or directed attack. 
2. PTN representation  
The question how the characteristics of a complex network change when some of its 
constituents are removed has many important practical implementations. Below, we 
will call such removal an attack. The notion of attack vulnerability of a network 
originates from studies of computer networks and denotes the decrease of network 
performance that is caused by removal of its nodes and/or links. In the case of a PTN, 
knowledge about its vulnerability allows both to take measures to protect its most 
vulnerable components as well as to possibly increase its resilience by planning its 
further development and evolution.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Representation of a PTN in graph form. L'-space: filled circles represent stations 
serviced by two different  routes shown by a bold and a thin line. L-space: reduction of  L' to a 
simple graph with single links. P-space: any two stations that are serviced by a common route 
are linked. B-space: stations  are  linked to the routes (open circles) they belong to. C-space:    
routes are connected when they share a common station 
To generate this knowledge we performed a thorough analysis of the behaviour under 
attack of PTNs of 14 major cities of the world, taking cities from different continents, 
with different concepts of planning and different history. In our sample, the number of 
stations N  and routes M  ranged from 1544=N , 124=M  (Düsseldorf) to 
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46244=N , 1893=M  (Los Angeles). This allowed us to produce a reliable 
statistics and to access some unique features of the networks under consideration.   
There are many different ways to represent a PTN of a city in a form of a 
graph, some of such representations – ‘spaces’ - are shown in Figs. 1, 2.  While the 
primary network topology is defined by a set of routes each servicing an ordered 
series of given stations (L'-space, see Fig.1, left), a number of different 
neighbourhood relations may be defined both for the routes and the stations. E.g. one 
either defines two stations as neighbours whenever they are serviced by a common 
route (P-space) or one considers networks formed by routes (nodes) that are 
connected if they share a common station (C-space).  In our analysis we made use of 
all the above representations, first looking on different characteristics of PTN 
calculated for the corresponding graphs and then performing attacks and measuring 
changes in these characteristics. The implementation (and effect) of an attack differs 
in different spaces. To give two examples: attacks in the L-space correspond to 
situations, in which given public transport stations and all their incident links cease to 
operate for all means of traffic that go through them, whereas if a station-node is 
removed in the P-space, the corresponding stop of the route is cancelled while the 
route otherwise keeps operating. The above described attacks refer to the removal of 
nodes. Alternatively, we have analyzed the behaviour of PTN when the links are 
removed [14]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The PTN of Berlin (left): Interpreting the stations as vertices and the lines as links 
(identifying multiple edges) results in an L-space graph. Right: The sub-network of nodes 
(links shown in bold red) that can be reached from Hertzallee (shown as a bold red spot) 
without changing mode of transport corresponds to the P-space neighbourhood of that station. 
With given PTN representation in the form of a graph we are in the position to 
describe the observables we will be interested in as well as to describe the way attacks 
of different strategies are performed. 
3. Observables and attack strategies 
In practice, the origin of the attack and its scenario may differ to large extent, 
ranging from random failure, when a node or a link in a network is removed at 
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random to a targeted destruction, when the most influential network constituents are 
removed according to their operating characteristics. Moreover, choosing a certain 
criterion, one can prepare the list of the nodes for the initial network and remove the 
nodes according to this list. Alternatively, one can continuously measure nodes (or 
links) characteristics after each step and modify such a list in the course of an attack. 
Attacks according to recalculated lists often turn out to be more harmful than the 
attack strategies based on the initial list, suggesting that the network structure changes 
as important nodes or links are removed [16,17].  
 One can single out two different impacts to the effectiveness of a network 
and its resilience during an attack. The first one has purely topological origin and is 
uniquely defined by network structure, the second one originates from the load on a 
network, i.e. it takes into account intensity of the transportation processes. In the 
particular case of a PTN this second impact is characterised by the number of vehicles 
or number of passengers that use a given route. In our study we will be interested only 
in the first impact, primary addressing the network topology and leaving aside its 
load. That is, speaking about network robustness to an attack we will first of all mean 
how ‘complete’ remains a PTN when its constituents are removed. There are different 
observables that are usually employed to characterise such robustness.  In particular, 
these are the mean shortest path length l , mean of its inverse 1−l , size of the 
largest component S  [12,13,16]. Below, we will exploit the last quantity defined as  
,/1 NNS =  (1) 
where N and 1N are numbers of nodes of the network and of its largest component 
correspondingly. In practice, for a finite network, such a quantity serves as an 
analogue of a giant connected component (GCC) which is defined for an infinite 
network only [1]. In turn, the GCC serves as the analogue of a percolation cluster, 
when the problem of network resilience is treated in terms of percolation theory [18].  
 
 
                 
a.      b. 
 
Fig. 3. The largest cluster size S  of different PTN as function of the fraction of 
removed nodes c . Random scenario. a: L-space,  b: P-space 
 
 In Fig. 3 we show how S changes as function of the concentration of 
removed nodes c when these nodes are removed randomly without any reference to 
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their characteristics. Below, we will call such scenario a random one and denote it as 
RV (random vertex). The data is displayed for the PTNs of 14 different cities, as 
listed in the corresponding legends. Fig. 3a shows results for the PTN represented as a 
graph in the L-space, whereas Fig. 3b shows data for the P-space. One immediately 
notes that the reaction of  the P-space graphs on random attacks is rather 
homogeneous and merely corresponds to continuous linear decrease of )(cS . This is 
easy to understand if one recalls that in the P-space each route enters the PTN 
representation as a complete graph and hence a random removal of any station node 
does not cause network segmentation.  On the contrary, the reaction of the PTN 
graphs on a random attack in the L-space ranges from abrupt breakdown (Dallas) to a 
slow almost linear decrease (Paris).  
 
 
Fig. 4. Largest component size S  of the PTN of Paris as function of  the fraction of  removed 
nodes c  for different attack scenarios. Each curve corresponds to a different scenario as 
indicated in the legend. Lists of removed nodes were prepared according to their degree k , 
closeness CC ,  graph GC , stress SC , and betweenness BC  centralities, clustering 
coefficient C , and next nearest neighbors number 2z . A superscript i refers to lists prepared 
for the initial PTN before the attack. RV and RN denote the removal of a random vertex or of 
its randomly chosen neighbour, respectively 
Before discussing correlations between the characteristics of unperturbed 
PTN and their robustness to attacks let us first explain different attack strategies we 
pursued in our study. In the network literature different attack scenarios are used to 
analyse the resilience of a complex network [12-14,16,17]. Generally, these are based 
on the intuitive assumption that the largest impact on a network is caused by the 
removal of its most important constituents. To quantify such importance of a node, 
one often uses the node degree k (i.e. the number of nearest neighbours of a given 
node), closeness CC , graph GC , stress SC , and betweenness BC centralities (see 
e.g. [19] for definitions and discussion ). To give an example, for a given node j  the 
last quantity is defined as 
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where )( jstσ   is the number of shortest paths between nodes s  and t  that belong to 
the network Ν  and go through the node j . One can also measure the importance of 
a given node by the number of its second nearest neighbours 2z  or its clustering 
coefficient C . The latter is the ratio of the actual number of links between the node’s 
nearest neighbours and the maximal possible number of mutual links between them. 
In our analysis we made use of different attack scenarios, removing the nodes 
according to the lists ordered by decreasing node degree k , centralities CC , GC , 
SC , BC , number of second nearest neighbours 2z , and increasing clustering 
coefficient C . Such lists were either prepared for an unperturbed network or 
recalculated after each step of attack. Together, this makes fourteen different attack 
scenarios which we completed by the above described random attack (RV) as well as 
by a scenario where a randomly chosen neighbour of a randomly chosen node (RN) is 
removed. The last scenario appears to be effective for immunization problems [20]. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Size of the largest cluster S as a function of the fraction of removed nodes c. 
P-space, highest betweenness scenario (recalculated) 
 
A typical result of our study is shown in Fig. 4. There, we show changes in the 
largest component size S  of the PTN of Paris as a function of the removed nodes 
fraction c  for the above described attack scenarios. Each curve corresponds to a 
different scenario as indicated in the legend. A similar analysis was performed for all 
other PTN from our database. As expected, it appears that the impact of an attack for 
a given PTN graph crucially depends on the attack scenario. Moreover, the most 
harmful scenarios differ for different graph representations (different ‘spaces’). In 
particular, for the L-space graphs the most harmful scenarios are those defined by the 
node degree, betweenness, closeness and stress centralities, and second nearest 
neighbours number whereas for the P-space graphs the node degree does not play 
Public Transport Networks under Random Failure and Directed Attack      7 
such an important role and the most destructive are centrality-oriented scenarios. In 
Fig. 5 we show the size of the largest cluster S  of different PTN graphs in P-space as 
a function of the fraction of removed nodes c  for the recalculated highest 
betweenness scenario which appears to be the most destructive for the P-space 
graphs. Indeed, the special role played by the highest betweenness nodes is explained 
by the fact, that they join different routes (represented in P-space by separate 
complete graphs) and their removal leads to rapid network segmentation.  
Another instance of our studies is given by Fig. 6. There we show the behaviour of 
the largest cluster S of different PTN observed when links are removed at random 
between station nodes in L-space. For each of the PTN randomly removing nodes 
appears to be more effective as randomly removing links [14]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Size of the largest cluster S as a function of the fraction of removed links c. 
L-space, random scenario 
4. Conclusions and outlook 
In our analysis we made an attempt to identify correlations between characteristics 
of the unperturbed PTN and their robustness to attacks. In particular, we have found 
[10], that some of the PTN under consideration manifest scale-free properties: their 
node degree distribution is governed by a power-law decay 
γ−kkP ~)( . (3) 
In the case of the L-space, the scale-free behaviour was markedly observed for 7 PTN 
out of 14, in the P-space these were 4 out of 14. An exponential decay of 
)(kP observed for the other PTN, nevertheless may be fitted by a power law (3) with 
less accuracy. Our analysis verifies correlations between the numerical value of the 
node-degree distribution exponent γ and the segmentation concentration of PTN (the 
last was numerically estimated on the base of different methods in [12,13], see also 
Fig. 7 for an illustration). In particular, both for the RV and the recalculated node-
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degree attack scenarios in L-space we have found that a small value of γ corresponds 
to higher PTN robustness. Notable examples are given by PTN of Paris ( 62.2=γ ), 
Saõ Paolo ( 72.2=γ ), and Hong Kong ( 99.2=γ ). The segmentation 
concentration for these PTN at the RV scenario it is 30.0;32.0;38.0=sc , 
respectively. Alternatively, at the same attack scenario PTNs of  London ( 48.4=γ ), 
Los Angeles ( 85.4=γ ), and Dallas ( 49.5=γ ) have much lower segmentation 
concentration: .090.0;130.0;175.0=sc  
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Search of the segmentation concentration during an attack scenario. From left to right: 
changes in the mean shortest path length, stress and betweenness centralities and size of the 
main cluster as functions of c  for the highest node degree (black curves) and  highest 
betweenness centrality scenarios for the Berlin PTN. 
Another instructive observation concerns the applicability of the Molloy-
Reed criterion [21] which has been formulated for networks with given node degree 
distribution but otherwise random linking between vertices. For such equilibrium 
networks a GCC was shown to be present if 
,0)2( ≥−kk  (4) 
where angular brackets stand for a network average in the limit of an infinite network 
with given )(kP . Therefore, a GCC is absent for small values of the 
parameter 2/2 <≡ kkκ . Calculating values of κ  for the unperturbed PTN we 
have found that for these real-world networks smaller values of κ  in general indicate 
a smaller segmentation concentration sc  both for the RV and for the recalculated 
node-degree attack scenarios in L-space. Alternatively, the mean shortest path length 
appears to be a useful indicator for PTN robustness to attacks in P-space. As we have 
shown [13], high resilience of a PTN in P-space in the highest betweenness centrality 
attack scenario is indicated by a small shortest path length of the unperturbed 
network. 
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